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Assess

Though an initial assessment was carried out during the initial response portion of the disaster recovery process, the (now activated) disaster recovery team will perform a more detailed and thorough assessment. The team will proceed to assess the extent of the damage to determine the proper steps necessary to ensure the organization’s ability to meet its mission and Maximum Tolerable Downtime (MTD). Depending on whether and what type of alternate computing facilities are available, the team could recommend that the ultimate restoration or reconstitution occurs at the alternate site. An additional aspect of the assessment not to be overlooked is the need to continually be mindful of ensuring the ongoing safety of organizational personnel.

Reconstitution

The primary goal of the reconstitution phase is to successfully recover critical business operations either at a primary or secondary site. If an alternate site is leveraged, adequate safety and security controls must be in place in order to maintain the expected degree of security the organization typically employs. The use of an alternate computing facility for recovery should not expose the organization to further security incidents. In addition to the recovery team’s efforts at reconstitution of critical business functions at an alternate location, a salvage team will be employed to begin the recovery process at the primary facility that experienced the disaster. Ultimately, the expectation is (unless wholly unwarranted given the circumstances) that the primary site will be recovered, and that the alternate facility’s operations will “fail back” or be transferred again to the primary center of operations.

Developing a BCP/DRP

Developing a BCP/DRP is vital for an organization’s ability to respond and recover from an interruption in normal business functions or a catastrophic event. In order to ensure that all planning has been considered, the BCP/DRP has a specific set of requirements to review and implement. Below are listed the high-level steps, according to NIST SP800-34, to achieving a sound, logical BCP/DRP. NIST SP800-34 is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, which can be found at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-34r1.pdf.

  • Project Initiation
  • Scope the Project
  • Business Impact Analysis
  • Identify Preventive Controls
  • Recovery Strategy
  • Plan Design and Development
  • Implementation, Training, and Testing
  • BCP/DRP Maintenance [12]

Learn by Example

Assessing Communications Risks

The home of United States Pacific Command (PACOM), the US military combatant command responsible for the Pacific region of the world, is located on Oahu, Hawaii. Combatant commands play a vital role in the US military’s overall mission. Oahu has limited power, personnel, and Internet connectivity due to its island environment. If PACOM wanted to create a BCP/DRP that addressed all the risks involved with operations on an island like Oahu, what should they consider? How much is PACOM dependent on the island of Oahu to provide communications services for military operations?

At the time of PACOM initiating BCP/DRP planning, it was determined that there were only four active communication submarine fiber optic cables that connect all of Hawaii’s communications. According to the International Cable Protection Committee (see https://www.iscpc.org/information/cable-data/), contrary to what most people think, satellite communications only provide about 5% of the total communications traffic to and from Hawaii [16]. Ninety-five percent are conducted over long fiber optic cables that span from Hawaii to California, Washington State, Japan, and Australia. Each cable connects to the island’s infrastructure at just two physical junctures on the island. A natural disaster such as a tsunami or typhoon could damage the connection points and render the entire island without IT or standard telephonic communications. Through PACOM’s business impact analysis, it was also discovered that each connection point’s physical security was fenced but with no guards or alarms. This meant that PACOM was vulnerable not only to natural physical threats but to malicious human threats as well. It was a result of PACOM’s BCP/DRP development effort that this vulnerability was discovered.